East Tennessee State University

Digital Commons @ East
Tennessee State University
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Student Works

5-2010

Alexander Hamilton and the National Bank.
Bradley Todd Dimmitt
East Tennessee State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd
Part of the Economic History Commons
Recommended Citation
Dimmitt, Bradley Todd, "Alexander Hamilton and the National Bank." (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1688.
https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/1688

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State
University. For more information, please contact digilib@etsu.edu.

Alexander Hamilton and the National Bank

_____________________

A thesis
presented to
the faculty of the Department of History
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Masters of Arts in History

_____________________

by
Bradley T. Dimmitt
May 2010

_____________________

Dr Melvin Page, Chair
Dr. Dale Schmitt
Dr. Dale Royalty
Dr. Emmett Essin

Keywords: Alexander Hamilton, National Bank, George Washington, James Madison, Thomas
Jefferson

ABSTRACT

Alexander Hamilton and the National Bank
by

Bradley T. Dimmitt

The purpose of this manuscript is to explain Alexander Hamilton’s idea that a national bank was
essential for America’s survival. Three key ingredients, clarified through the use of letters and
documents, are used to understand the importance of Hamilton’s objective: 1) Hamilton’s
relationship with George Washington, discussed in chapter one; 2) James Madison’s and Thomas
Jefferson’s arguments against Hamilton’s ideas, discussed in chapters two and three; and 3)
Hamilton’s proposal for the bank and his opinion in favor of its constitutionality, including the
idea that the necessary and proper clause expands the authority of government, discussed in
chapter four.
The prosperity and stability America experienced after the national bank threw open its door is
proof that Hamilton’s initiatives were needed. While James Madison is considered the Father of
the Constitution, Hamilton is most definitely it foremost interpreter.
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CHAPTER 1
MR. WASHINGTON GOES TO NEW YORK

In February 1791, a day after reviewing Alexander Hamilton’s opinion on the
constitutionality of the national bank, and despite some lingering doubts, Washington signed the
Bank Bill into law. While James Madison is considered the Father of the Constitution, Hamilton,
as Ron Chernow wrote, is its “foremost interpreter, starting with the Federalist and continuing
with his treasury tenure, when he had to expound constitutional doctrines to accomplish goals.”1
Hamilton was influenced by several leading politicians of the era, none more so, however, than
George Washington. It can be argued that if Hamilton and Washington had not developed such a
close relationship, Washington may have been persuaded to accept Madison’s view that the
original holders should be compensated or Thomas Jefferson’s argument that the national bank
was unconstitutional. Hamilton’s connection with Washington turned out to be his biggest asset.
It is appropriate, therefore, before examining the necessity of the national bank, to recount the
affiliation between Hamilton and Washington in order to understand why, in part, Hamilton was
able to succeed in getting his bank plan passed.
It is interesting when reading through the letters of Hamilton and Washington in the early
stages of the Revolution to recognize that many of the letters written by Hamilton echoed those
written by his mentor. Both men consistently talked of national unity or, as Hamilton wrote to
George Clinton in March 1778, “to preserve a national character.”2 As Richard Morris wrote, “in
the years that followed that sense of nationalism was to be the most powerful intellectual bond
1

Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 355.

2

Alexander Hamilton, letter to George Clinton, March, 1778, in ed., Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke,
Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. I (Columbia University Press: New York, 1962), 440.
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between Hamilton and Washington.”3 In Hamilton’s Continentalist essays he expounded upon
his ideas of national unity.
When Washington’s military conduct was being attacked by a political faction called the
“Conway Cabal,” Hamilton was one of General Washington’s most ardent supporters despite
Hamilton’s dissatisfaction when Washington refused his request for a combat command. It
seems that Hamilton was willing to put “patriotism and knowledge of the country’s essential
need for Washington” above his own disaffection.4 Hamilton did eventually receive his own
command and by the end of the war the two had mended their ties. In a letter to Washington on
March 24, 1783, Hamilton said, “I congratulate your Excellency on his happy conclusion of your
labors.”5
Although the two statesmen wrote few letters to one another in the years after the
Revolution, both agreed that the weakness of the Confederacy was a detriment to national unity
and that a more centralized power was critical. When fears that Hamilton’s ideas expressed at the
Constitutional Convention would lead to the same tyranny America had fought to break with,
Washington wrote to Hamilton offering his encouragement. “The men who oppose a strong and
energetic government are, in my opinion, narrow minded politicians [who reflect] local views.”6
As the newly elected president rode the two week long journey from his home in Mount
Vernon to the nation’s capital in New York, George Washington waxed pessimistically about his
3

Richard B. Morris, “Washington and Hamilton: a Great Collaboration,” Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, 102, no. 2 (Apr. 30, 1958): 109.
4

Morris, 111.

5

Hamilton to George Washington, 24 March 1783, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. III 304.
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George Washington, letter to Alexander Hamilton, 28 August 1788, in ed., John C. Fitzpatrick, The
Writings of George Washington, Vol. 5, (United States Government Printing Office: Washington D.C.), 207.
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new assignment. During the Constitutional Convention Washington was able to sit by silently as
the other delegates debated the structure and function of each governmental branch. As
president, however, he was now the leading voice of the American nation. It is certainly true that
his leadership qualities provided him with an advantage in leading the nation through its infancy
and everyone including himself thought he was more than capable of completing the task. Many
thought his presence alone would prevent the nation from splintering.
After the Constitution was ratified, Hamilton pleaded with Washington to accept the
presidency. Broadus Mitchell wrote that Washington’s acceptance “would ensure in the eyes of
all, at home and abroad, the most promising auspices.”7 Hamilton knew that Washington was the
only person who could lead the nation at that point. In November 1788 Hamilton wrote
Washington that “It is no compliment to say that no other man can sufficiently unite the public
opinion or can give the requisite weight to the office in the commencement of Government.”8 It
has been stated that Washington had the easiest election in American history. This was so in
large part because he was not elected, as Joseph Ellis wrote, “for what he thought, but for who he
was.”9As Hamilton wrote on August 13, 1788, in a letter addressed to Washington,
“I take it for granted, Sir, you have concluded to comply with what will no doubt
be the general call of your country in relation to the new government. You will
permit me to say that it is indispensible you should lend yourself to its first
operations—It is too little purpose to have introduced a system, if the weightiest
influence is not given to its firm establishment, in the outset.”10

7

Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: A Concise Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),

8

Hamilton, to George Washington, 18 November 1788, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. V, 234.
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Joseph J. Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 184.
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Hamilton to George Washington, 13 August 1788, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. V, 202
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In a return letter, Washington articulated his reluctance in pursuing such an important position.
After a long and taxing war, Washington’s body was beginning to feel its age. There was also the
concept at the time that outward ambition for any public office was seen as dangerous. Hamilton,
however, reiterated how important it was for Washington to accept this position. The convention
was of little worth if the most important piece of the puzzle did not take his rightful place within
the picture. “I am not sure that your refusal would not throw everything into confusion,”
Hamilton wrote Washington, “I am sure that it would have the worst effect imaginable.”11
Hamilton knew just the right words to use to persuade Washington to accept the presidency.
On the other hand, Washington knew that if the nation struggled or eventually faltered, he
would be forever held responsible for its undoing, a terrible burden for any man to live with.
Hamilton warned Washington that if the government miscarried, “the blame will in all
probability be laid on the system itself. And the framers of it will have to encounter the disrepute
of having brought about a revolution without substituting anything that was worthy of the effort.
They pulled down one utopia, it will be said, to build up another.”12 It was sincerely felt by
everyone that Congress and the President, as the first members to take their seats at the head of
government truly faced an exhausting struggle. On April 1, 1789, on the eve of his inauguration
Washington wrote his beloved friend Henry Knox that
“For myself, the delay may be compared to a reprieve . . . that my movements to
this chair of Gov. [are] accompanied by a feeling not unlike those of a culprit who
is going to his place of execution: so unwilling am I, in the evening of my life . . .
to quit a peaceful abode for an Ocean of difficulties, without that competency of
political skill, abilities, and inclination which is necessary to manage the helm.”13
11

Hamilton to George Washington, 18 November 1788, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. V, 234.
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Hamilton to George Washington, September 1788, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. V, 221.
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Washington to Henry Knox, 1 April 1789, The Writings of George Washington Vol. 30, 268.
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Disregarding his apprehensions, Washington knew that America, if it held together, was destined
for greatness. In his last Circular to the States in 1783, he emphasized the “enviable condition”
the citizens of the United States were “blessed” with.14
“They are, from this period to be considered as Actors on a most conspicuous
Theater . . . they are not only surrounded with everything which can contribute to
the completion of private and domestic enjoyment, but Heaven has crowned all its
other blessings, by giving a fairer opportunity for political happiness, than any
other nation has ever been favored with.”15
On April 20 in the Senate Chamber at Federal Hall, Washington was officially sworn in
as the first president of the United States. As he read his inaugural address, Washington
pronounced that the new government would be held responsible for the success or failure of the
new country and the reputations of everyone would be measured by the American people, “since
the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of
government are justly considered, perhaps, as deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment
entrusted to the hands of the American people.”16 He also acknowledged that because “The battle
royal over the Constitution” had divided the nation to such a large extent, “America needed,” as
Chernow wrote, “a first president of unimpeachable integrity who would embody the rich
premise of the new republic.”17 With Washington as president, it was hoped stability would be
provided for the new nation. Of all the challenges Washington faced, none was larger than
convincing the American people he was not a monarch, and, thus, would not be tempted by

14

George Washington, “Circular to the States, June 8, 1783,” in Writings of George Washington, Vol. 26
ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (United States Printing Office: Washington D.C.), 484.
15

Washington, “Circular,” 485.
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Davis Newton Lott, The Presidents Speak: The Inaugural Address of the American Presidents, from
Washington to Clinton (New York: Henry Holt and Company 1994), 5.
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Chernow, 270.
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power. He was determined, however, to lend his last ounce of energy to ensure that the citizens
of the new nation began to view themselves as Americans and that all foreign nations will look
upon the United States with respect.18
Although he made it a point to visit all thirteen states during the first year of his
presidency, he spent most of his time, during the latter half of 1789 sifting through applications
in an attempt to construct a cabinet. Six months after taking the oath of office, Washington
requested and received the financial records of the old confederation government. As he thumbed
through the mountain of paper, he quickly realized that he had inherited a massive debt, and that
he was not the person who could straighten it all out. As Joseph Ellis wrote, “The records were
filled with floating bond rates, complicated currency conversion tables, and guesswork revenue
projections that, taken together, resembled an accountant’s worse nightmare.”19
In July of 1789 Congress passed two revenue acts intended to generate revenue. The acts
proved, however, to be of little significance. The problem was that the collection of these taxes
was lackadaisical. With little money coming in and an enormous debt staring it in the face,
Congress finally decided it had to create a series of executive departments, which it
accomplished September 2, 1789. Throughout the process of choosing an executive department,
Washington continually consulted Madison, who was instrumental in helping Washington select
executive and judicial appointments. With the exception of the position of Post Master General,
Washington selected four individuals whose brilliance played a significant role in shaping the
infant nation: Henry Knox, Edmund Randolph, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson. He

18

Ellis, His Excellency, 186.

19

Ellis, His Excellency, 203.
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was also blessed with the genius of Vice President John Adams. In June 1790 Washington wrote
his Revolutionary compatriot Marquis de Lafayette expressing his satisfaction with the affairs of
the United States. The newest members of the executive branch were “harmonizing extremely
well together. I believe that these and the other appointments generally have given perfect
satisfaction to the Public.”20
With the appointment of these individuals, Washington had surrounded himself with
some of the most intellectually gifted men of the era, and probably in American history—a
dream team of sorts. It was his sincere hope that by appointing the brightest of the best, they
would be able to put their differences aside and mold their talents together for the betterment of
the nation. The two members who played the most prominent role within the new government
were Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson became Secretary of State in
February 1790 only after being persuaded by his good friend Madison. Jefferson first received a
letter of inquiry from Madison asking whether he would be interested in accepting a role within
Washington’s administration. In October of 1789 President Washington himself wrote Jefferson
about his desire to have Jefferson be part of the administration.
“In the selection of characters to fill the important offices of Government of the
United States, I was naturally led to contemplate the talents and disposition which
I knew you possess . . . And without being able to consult your inclination . . . I
was determined . . . to nominate you for the Department of State . . . But as
grateful as your acceptance of this Commission would be to me, I am at the same
time desirous to accommodate your wishes . . .”21
In December 1789 Jefferson expressed to Washington his willingness to mold his talents around
the president’s agenda. Jefferson, however, did express his fear of criticism by a “misinformed

20

Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, 3 June 1790, The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 31, 46.

21

Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 13 October 1789, The Writings of George Washington Vol. 30, 446.
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and misled” public that would possibly become dissatisfied with his performance. Therefore, he
continued, since he shared a “degree of familiarity” with his present situation, and since the
“change in government” in France could possibly procure “new advantages in commerce,” he
preferred to stay where he was. If, however, Washington felt that transferring him to a different
position was best for the country, “my [Jefferson’s] inclination must be of no obstacle . . . If it
should be to remain at New York, my chief comfort will be to work under your eye. I shelter the
authority of your name, and the wisdom of measures to be dictated by you, and implicitly
executed by me.”22
Washington had first approached Robert Morris about the Secretary of Treasury position
in early September 1789. Morris was a logical choice given his experience with the colonies’
finances during the Revolution. Overall, however, he would have been a poor selection because
of his ties with the old government and the fact that there were suspicions of corruption
surrounding some of his business dealings. The economist Robert Wright suggested that, given
these misgivings, Washington “sighed with relief” when he learned Morris had turned down the
position.23 Upon turning down Washington’s request, Morris suggested that Hamilton fill the
position. Hamilton was very much like Washington in the sense that he advocated an energetic
government and fiscal reform. For Hamilton the appointment as Secretary of Treasury allowed

22

Thomas Jefferson, letter to George Washington, 15 December 1789, in ed. Julian P. Boyd and Alfred L.
Bush, Papers of Thomas Jefferson Vol. 16 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1961), 34-35.
23

Robert Wright, One Nation Under Debt: Hamilton, Jefferson, and the History of What We Owe (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 127.
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him to reach his personal ambition of creating, as Cerami wrote, the “financial machinery that
would drive a dominating federal government.”24
With the exception of Martha Washington, Washington’s relationship with Hamilton was
unmatched. During the Revolution, Hamilton served as Washington’s aid-de-camp. Cerami
wrote that “The brilliant immediacy of Hamilton’s responses to almost every situation made
Washington regard him [Hamilton] as an equal, more than he did some of his leading
generals.”25 At one point during the Constitutional Convention, Hamilton, in disgust, walked out
of the proceedings. Washington pleaded with Hamilton to return, stating to Hamilton that the
“crisis at hand required [his] presence.”26”I am sorry you went away. I wish you were back, The
case is equally important and alarming, and no opposition under such circumstances should
discourage exertions till the signature is fixed,” Washington wrote.27 As president, Washington
often confided in Hamilton about the etiquette of the office of president, adopting most of
Hamilton’s advice.
After the passage of the Judiciary Act in 1789 and the dismissal of the hotly debated
Quaker petitions that advocated the abolition of slavery, Washington turned his attention to the
“debt-burdened American economy.”28 He delegated the task of restructuring America’s finances
to his energetic Secretary of Treasury. Hamilton studied various essays written by some of the

24

Charles Cerami, Young Patriots: The Remarkable Story of Two Men, Their Impossible Plan and the
Revolution that Created the Constitution (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks Inc., 2005), 285.
25

Cerami, 28.

26

Ellis, His Excellency, 178.
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Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 10 July 1787, Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. IV, 225.
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brightest financiers of the era, in particular Pelatuah Webster’s “Dissertation on . . . the Office of
a Financier-General” (1781), while also reexamining the history of the Bank of England for
guidance. Finances, however, was not something Hamilton was just learning at this time. During
the war, while intensely engrossed in the military affairs of the Continental Army, his thoughts
often turned to subjects of foreign policy and finances. He often consulted Madison, William
Bingham, and Stephen Higginson, the latter two being “business men of Philadelphia and
Boston.”29
It took Hamilton just three months to calculate the numbers and compile his notes,
estimating that the total debt, which included foreign, domestic, and state, was around $80
million, with $4.5 million in interest tacked on annually. What emerged from Hamilton’s labor
was a forty-thousand word document entitled: A Report on Public Credit, one of two reports that
Hamilton would write. In the first Report, Hamilton proposed two mechanisms for solving
America’s financial woes: funding the state and federal debts and repaying the foreign debts. His
second Report proposed the creation a national bank to oversee all transactions. While historians
and economists have concluded that Hamilton’s ideas made perfect sense, the two reports ignited
a firestorm within Congress and Washington’s cabinet that nearly tore the country apart. As
Mitchell wrote, “The question of assumption of the war obligations of the states, while
pecuniary, was more political, for it aroused the jealousies of the states who did not want to see
the importance of the national government magnified.”30 This was because his plan, particularly
the creation of a national bank, many feared would increase the power of the federal government
beyond what was intended by the Constitution and could possibly result in the evaporation of

29

30

Mitchell, 181-182.
Mitchell, 188.
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state authority. This fear was expressed by those who opposed the Constitution during the
ratification process as well. There were even a few members of the House of Representatives
who found Hamilton’s report difficult to understand, and it was argued at the time that he made it
difficult on purpose, believing that those who did not understand it would accept his ideas out of
fear of being seen as incompetent.
Publicly Washington never mentioned whether he was an opponent or proponent of
Hamilton’s financial system. In letters written by Washington and Hamilton to one another, the
amalgamation of the debts or the creation of a national bank was never a topic of discussion.
Privately Washington thought the plan to be sound and deeply regretted the opposition to it,
particularly in his home state; in Virginia, the idea of a national bank was greeted with talk of
secession. Upon Washington’s request, Jefferson, Madison, and Randolph, in-house counsel for
the federal government, submitted arguments explaining the unconstitutionality of Hamilton’s
bank plan. Washington, before making a decision, sent all three written arguments to Hamilton
so he could manufacture a reply. What emerged from Hamilton’s office was a landmark brief
that expounded upon the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution, which is considered the
birth of implied powers. The difference of opinion between Jefferson and Hamilton created
enormous fractures within the administration, which eventually contributed to Jefferson’s
resignation at the end of 1793.
Washington worked “unceasingly” to reconcile the separation between Jefferson and
Hamilton.31 Their political disagreements made such attempt pointless. Jefferson believed the
federal government was limited to those powers specifically enumerated by the Constitution.

31

Lott, 1.

14

Hamilton was convinced the federal government was not restricted to those powers expressly
declared by the Constitution. It was soon realized—to the chagrin of some and the exuberance of
others--that “political peace between Jefferson and Hamilton was impossible despite
Washington’s efforts.”32
While he was president George Washington had many of his speeches, state papers, and
proclamations written by Hamilton. The ideas of both, while conflicting at times, meshed very
well together. As Morris wrote, “In some cases they were a vehicle for ideas that originated with
Hamilton; in numerous others they were a literary rephrasing of Washington’s own thoughts.”33
There is, of course, no better example of this “literary partnership” then Washington’s Farewell
Address, which, according to Morris, “exemplifies the degree of collaboration and agreement”
between the statesmen.34 To be sure, without the trust the two men had for each other, the
policies of Hamilton would have never been instituted.
Hindsight, with its 20/20 vision, offers an enormous advantage. It is easy, some two
hundred years later, to conclude that the bank plan was essential to the survival of the nation.
There were, however, many in early American society who felt that the bank plan was creating a
dangerous precedent. While the Constitution created three equal branches, powerful enough to
check the others so no branch would become dominate, the delegates sincerely felt that, because
the House of Representatives was elected by the people and, therefore, represented the interests
of the people, it would provide a check on the executive. Hamilton’s interpretation of the

32

Lott, 1.
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Morris, 114.
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Morris, 114.
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necessary and proper clause, it was believed, would effectively destroy such a check and shift the
advantage to the executive branch, creating a monarchical system that everyone feared.
Through hindsight, it can be seen that this was not the case. America had a president in
Washington who feared power and who surrounded himself with individuals with different
opinions about the role of the executive, but who believed in the system they helped to create,
and who accepted the position that Hamilton’s plan, although potentially dangerous, was
essential to America’s survival.
The goal of this composition is to review Hamilton’s argument concerning a national
bank and to illustrate his conviction that without the bank America would have been unable to
persevere let alone grow or improve itself. It was the nucleus of America’s financial system. The
other elements of Hamilton’s agenda were extricable linked to a national bank. Madison argued
that state controlled banks were sufficient and failed to support Hamilton’s plan. As it will be
seen, America under the Articles of Confederation proved that the states were not capable of
handling such an enormous responsibility. With Hamilton’s guidance and with federal control,
the Bank of the United States became a resounding success and America prospered.

16

CHAPTER 2
THE DEBATE OVER ASSUMPTION

Alexander Hamilton probably imagined that his Report on Public Credit and Further
Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit would raise the ire of many members of
Congress. He probably did not imagine, however, that the two reports would create the outcry of
opposition that they did. While chapter two introduces Hamilton’s assumption bill through his
own words, its focus is on Madison’s rebuttal and counter-proposal. Chapter three examines
Jefferson’s opinion against the constitutionality of the national bank. Both are critical to
understanding why the bank plan was so important to America’s survival because if the results
had turned out differently, and Madison’s proposal and Jefferson’s opinion had been accepted,
the economic growth America experienced probably would not have occurred.
Hamilton’s plan was to create a vigorous central government. Days after taking office,
Hamilton reorganized the customs service, since customs duties were America’s main source of
revenue. When custom officers reported their figures to the Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton
was so alarmed by the low numbers, which indicated a high level of smuggling, that he hinted to
friends about forming a company of guard boats as a way to enforce compliance. If Hamilton
had followed through with his plan according to Ron Chernow, the United States Coast Guard
would have been created much earlier than it was.35 Hamilton was also instrumental in

35

Chernow, 295.
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constructing an American/British trading alliance, possibly making him “the administration’s
most influential figure on foreign policy.”36
Reorganizing America’s finances was Hamilton’s top priority, and the most critical
question was what should be done about the enormous debt. Several proposals for settling the
debts of the states and the federal government had been debated by the Confederation Congress,
all different in one aspect or another. In 1787 the Congress finally agreed on an ordinance that
widened the “latitude to claims for credit against the Union.”37 Samuel Otis, a member of the
Continental Congress from 1788 to 1789, wrote that he had on occasion contemplated federal
assumption and thought that it would surely happen. In effect, the ordinance allowed for
payments to be made with species not sanctioned by the Confederation Congress. Upon the
ordinances passage, Madison wrote to Jefferson that “The settlement of the Public accounts has
long been pursued in various shapes and with little prospect of success. The idea which has long
been urged by some of us, seems now to be seriously embraced.”38 The problem, according to
Harold Syrett, was that if it had been largely ignored, the ordinance would have increased the
amount of the debt by $80 to $90 million. In addition, the ordinance failed to settle the problem
of who was to pay what for the costs of the war. It had also been debated during the
Constitutional Convention and during ratification. During the debates, it was supported by some
delegates and looked at with disdain by others. The North Carolina ratifying convention
proposed a Constitutional amendment “prohibiting the Federal assumption of state debts or

36

Chernow, 295.
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“Introductory Note,” Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. XI,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 58.
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intervening in state provisions of them.” 39 With the debt growing ever larger, the first Congress
urged Hamilton to report on ways to solve the dilemma. What developed from Hamilton’s desk
was a series of recommendations followed by a storm of controversy.
Hamilton’s two reports on public credit are a summary of America’s financial burdens
and a series of recommendations to effectively deal with the enormous debt. Most of the debt
incurred by the states and the Confederation Congress was owed to “domestic creditors” who
received IOUs for helping finance the Revolution.40 To everyone, particularly Hamilton, it was
paramount that the new nation pay back what it owed so that its ability to borrow could be
restored. In its simplest terms, Hamilton’s first Report on Public Credit recommended that the
federal government “assume responsibility” for all debts incurred during the Revolution, and that
it repay the debt to current holders at “full face-value.” 41 His second Report recommended using
the national debt to establish a national bank to oversee federal transactions, the collection of
taxes, and the revival of the economy through loans.
Scouring through the pages of English history, Hamilton noticed that in the 1690s
England had used its public credit to build up its Royal Navy, finance wars, and maintain its
commercial empire. It established the Bank of England to oversee the collection of excise taxes
and issue government bonds to grow its economy, since the bonds could be used as collateral for
future loans. Great Britain, Hamilton reasoned, was the key to America’s financial success. Not
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(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 309.
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only did Hamilton wish to use Britain’s financial system as a model, but he was insistent on
establishing a friendly connection with British ministers to ensure the success of his plan.
Britain, Hamilton contended, could be an assest to or if a confrontation arose a hindrance to
America’s well-being. Contrary to the opinions of many of his colleagues, Hamilton did not
intend to reconstruct America in the image of Britain, as one historian wrote, his “objective was
to promote American prosperity and self-sufficiency and make the country ultimately less reliant
on British capital.”42
His Report began by stating that the debt incurred during the Revolution was the “price
of liberty.”43 The Confederation Congress did not have the revenue to finance the war, since it
was not empowered to levy taxes, and the states refused to tax their citizens--borrowing money
from individuals and foreign nations was the only solution. Honoring these debts was imperative
to America’s survival, for it would build trust with future leaders, allowing America to gain
creditability with European powers. Unfortunately, a large amount of the debt had not been
paid—in large part because some states found it inconvenient to honor their commitments.
“There is indeed reason to regret that it [the obligation to pay back the debt] has not hitherto been
kept,” Hamilton wrote, “that the necessities of the war, conspiring with inexperience in the
subjects of finance, produced direct infractions; and that the subsequent period has been a
continued scene of negative violation, or non-compliance.”44 To ensure the continuation of the
new nation, the government must be able to borrow money at affordable interest rates. “States,
like individuals,” Hamilton continued, “who observe their engagements are respected and
42

Chernow, 296.
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trusted, while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct. Every breach of
the public engagements, whether from choice or necessity, is in different degrees hurtful to
public credit.”45 To extinguish the debt, both interest and principal, Hamilton proposed a plan of
setting aside revenue in a sinking fund at regular intervals throughout the fiscal year.
Viewed through Hamilton’s eyes, this assumption made perfect sense. On the one hand,
assumption of the debt would put all creditors on equal footing with one another, since everyone
would have the “same interest,” as Hamilton wrote.46 It would also, as Lance Banning
concluded, “counterbalance . . . the local loyalties that Hamilton had long regarded as the
greatest dangers to the Union.”47 On the other hand, his funding program would energize
manufacturing and commerce since creditors could use the interest paid to them to reinvest in the
economy.
The amalgamation of the national debt was not the most controversial aspect of
Hamilton’s Report. The section that caused the most disagreement concerned the IOUs given to
citizens who helped fund the war and soldiers or their families who gave their blood for years
without the certainty of pay, all for the cause of independence. Should the original holders, those
who had bought the bonds during the war with the expectation of being paid back when it was
over, be tracked down and paid back, or should the current holders pocket all the rewards? As
one author wrote, Hamilton’s answer to these questions set the tone for America’s future
financial markets. “To establish the concept of ‘security of transfer,’ Hamilton was willingly, if
necessary, to reward mercenary scoundrels and penalize patriotic citizens,” by allowing the
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transfer of the bonds to stand.48 To Hamilton’s understanding, the original holders had willingly
sold their bonds, receiving cash in return, while the current owners risked their money and
should be rewarded.
Another issue Hamilton addressed was the consolidation of the state, national, and
foreign debt into one large federal debt. In Hamilton’s view consolidation was important for
several reasons. For one, it was more efficient. Instead of having several small, state operated
plans, there would be one “overarching scheme.”49 This would give bond holders a stake in the
federal government, shifting their allegiance away from the state governments. In addition,
amalgamation would prevent the state governments from competing against the federal
government for revenue.
Third, once the debts were consolidated, the question of interest rates owed on the IOUs
and the national debts surfaced. After much thought, Hamilton proposed that the foreign debt be
paid at the original four to five percent rate, while creditors who were owed IOUs be given the
choice of either receiving part of the payback at the original six percent rate and a fixed number
of acres of western land, or receive the payback at a much lower interest rate that would be
stretched over a number of years. To pay back the owners of the bonds, Hamilton suggested that
Congress tax wine and spirits, teas, and coffee. He wrote: “That the articles which have been
enumerated, will, better than most others, bear high duties, can hardly be a question. They are all
of them, in reality—luxuries—the greatest part of them foreign luxuries; some of them, in the
excess in which they are used, pernicious luxuries.”50 In addition, the federal government would
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tax the sales of carriages and playing cards and anything sold at an auction, while also taxing
imported items, such as spices, sugar, molasses, and salts. Hamilton estimated that the revenue
generated from the taxes would trim the national debt by $1.04 million. Not only did Hamilton
believe that a tax on these articles could yield enormous revenue, but by taxing such
extravagances or pernicious luxuries, with their morally decaying effects, Hamilton thought that
consumption could possibly decrease. “The consumption of ardent spirits particularly, no doubt
very much on the account of their cheapness, is carried to an extreme . . . is truly regretted . . . a
decrease of the consumption of these articles, the effect would be, in every respect.”51 He
doubted, however, that man would be able to detach himself because such habits “are not easily
alienated.”52 The idea of taxing luxuries of these sorts because they are believed to be morally
deteriorating was also proposed by Morris. In a letter addressed to Washington, Morris wrote, “It
may be boldly affirmed, that no inconvenience can arise from laying a tax on the use of ardent
spirits. These have always been equally prejudicial to the constitution and morals of the
people.”53 Those who opposed Hamilton’s Report, disapproved of it for several reasons
including the argument that taxation would put an undue burden on the public and saddle the
economy; the sale of western lands would be much more feasible.
Finally, Hamilton warned that a well-funded debt should not be perpetual.54 While, on the
one hand, in order for America to improve and grow, Hamilton believed it had to be able to
borrow money. The United States did not have the resources to make the necessary
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advancements that were required. In addition, foreign entities that were willing to lend money
would have an interest in America’s survival, and, if the national government paid the debt in a
timely manner under the conditions stated, the new nation would gain credibility along the way.
On the other hand, he argued, the debt had to be eventually extinguished. In one of the important
passages of the Report, Hamilton wrote, “that he ardently wishes to see it incorporated, as a
fundamental maxim, in the system of public credit of the United States, that the creation of the
debt be accompanied with the means of extinguishment. This he regards as the true secret for
rendering public credit immortal.”55
Hamilton filed his Report immediately after completing it January 9, 1790. Once filed, a
debate broke out in Congress over whether the document should be delivered by Hamilton
himself or read out loud by a second party. The fear of executive encroachment upon legislative
affairs led Congress to require the Report to be read by someone else. It was reasoned that the
Constitution explicitly separates the branches of government so that it is difficult for one branch
to influence another, or so that one branch does not engulf another. The fear was that by allowing
Hamilton, a member of the executive branch, to read the document himself, a precedent would
be established that could allow the executive branch a voice in legislative debates.
The debate over Hamilton’s Report took several directions. Opponents immediately
declaimed Hamilton’s plan as too lengthy. “It was so lengthy,” Chernow wrote, “that, by the end,
many representatives sat there in stupefied silence.”56 Some also argued that it was too complex,
or cried that it was moving things too fast, on too many fronts. Others stated the plan resembled
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too much the financial system of Britain. Still others feared the supporters of the plan, especially
those from New York, were dabbling in government securities in anticipation of its passage.
During this time it was believed by many within Congress that a group of stock-jobbers,
“wealthy dealers in securities,” were intruding upon the legislative branch, asking various
Congressmen to divulge any information about Hamilton’s intentions.57 Even one of Hamilton’s
closest friends, Henry Lee, could not hold back his excitement, inquiring to Hamilton about
information in the Report. This particular argument caught the attention of the President, who
questioned Hamilton about the matter. In his defense, Hamilton assured the President that, “As
far as I know there is not a single member of the legislature who can be properly called a stockjobber or a paper dealer.”58 Even if some members were engaged in such activity, Hamilton
continued, there is nothing inappropriate about becoming proprietors in the funds of the
country.59 Moreover, certain members of Congress venomously contended that the plan was a
device to tip the scales of power from the people’s branch to the executive. Finally, opponents
pointed to the fact that southern farmers, because of their ignorance of finances, were being
taken advantage of by devilish northern merchants who had swarmed to the South—many even
before the Report had been filed—to buy up southern IOUs in order to make a substantial profit.
On February 8, 1790, the debate over Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit began. For a
whole week prior to the arguments, Hamilton lobbied various members of Congress trying to
secure votes. Some members who opposed Hamilton’s proposal viewed his efforts as a violation
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of America’s system of government.60 Initially, the Report was quickly sent to the Committee of
the Whole who, after narrowly adopting Hamilton plan, sent it back to the House for
consideration. When time came for the House to vote, however, the momentum towards
acceptance fell apart. Quakers, for example, had re-petitioned the end to the importation of
slavery. Their petition riled southerners who already had a fear that Hamilton’s plan could
possibly give the government power to accomplish just that. In addition, states that were heavily
indebted threatened civil war and succession if the plan was affirmed.
The debate over funding and assumption brought unfortunate consequences for Hamilton.
Not only did he raise the ire of southern planters, he lost the support of his most trusted
colleague. One member of the House of Representatives that Hamilton expected to support his
Report was his Federalist colleague James Madison. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton,
Madison, and John Jay argued that the biggest threat to liberty was overbearing state
governments. Now, however, Madison feared that the government he had helped to create was
becoming too powerful for America’s good. One historian debated whether Madison was
prodded by Jefferson to abandon his nationalist views.61 In any event, Hamilton now faced a new
foe who was just as talented as him.
In his book Sacred Fire of Liberty, Lance Banning argued that while students of Madison
like to view him as a proponent of expansive federal power because in 1781 Madison conducted
a campaign to expand federal power, this idea is largely fiction. Banning contended that
Hamilton and Madison were polar opposites when it came to their ideas about how to set the new
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government on a solid foundation. He wrote that “Although he [Madison] plainly hoped that
national prosperity and strength would benefit all segments of the population, his immediate
concern was with the state [of Virginia].62 In his “Motion of Impost,” presented February 3,
1781, Madison recommended, as “indispensible necessary,” that the Confederation Congress be
granted the power to institute a 5% tax on foreign imports, while vesting Congress with the
authority to collect the revenue and use it towards its debt.63 Banning noted that Madison was not
opposed to the idea of granting Congress the power to collect taxes, nor was Madison opposed to
the idea that the taxes could be collected by congressional appointees and used to restore the
financial credit of the United States. In fact, Madison wrote that collection of the revenue should
be given to the “offices which shall be appointed by Congress to collect the said impost,” after
being awarded with “all the legal authority necessary to the execution of this duty.”64 Instead,
Banning argued that Madison discouraged the granting of congressional power to impose taxes
or use the revenue beyond the repayment of the debt. As Banning concluded, while Madison
supported the idea of taxing certain items and collecting and distributing the revenue, he was
opposed to expanding “congressional authority as far as many of his fellows would have
liked.”65
Banning also downplayed the idea that Madison was in any way, shape, or form a
nationalist. He wrote that although Madison was in favor of strengthening the Confederation
government’s power during the latter part of the Revolution, and although he argued for a federal
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government strong enough to combat the states, his aims should not be construed as a
nationalistic thrust towards an all-powerful government. When presenting his argument
supporting an amendment to the Articles of Confederation granting Congress the power to force
delinquent states to oblige their federal duties, Banning stressed, Madison’s intent was to coerce
the states to help with the war effort not to increase federal powers. He feared that invoking the
doctrine of implied powers would potentially evaporate the limitations and boundaries imposed
on government.66
Banning’s claim that Madison‘s nationalistic intentions were fiction can be supported by
letters he wrote in the 1820s. After his presidential duties had concluded and he retired to his
home in Montplier, Madison wrote John Tyler in 1823 and Robert Garnett in 1824 insisting that
his nationalist views during the Constitutional Convention were meant to distinguish between a
government whose authority rested on the consent of the state and a government whose authority
should rest upon the consent of the people. His views, in Banning’s mind, were not intended to
give the federal government unlimited powers to construct and institute laws and corporations
not explicitly granted by the people through the Constitution.67
While Banning’s assessment of Madison is partly accurate, it does not reveal the whole
story. It can be argued that Madison did, in fact, do an about-face and that his turnaround was
due to the fact that under Hamilton’s financial system—federal assumption of the debt and the
creation of a national bank—the planter classes of the South, especially Virginia, realized they
were no longer America’s political elite. As Ellis wrote, “Hamilton and his banking cronies thus
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became the personification of the reasons for Virginia’s economic decline.”68 It did not help that
many Virginia planters did not understand the complexities of accounting procedures, which left
many planters, to their surprise, facing bankruptcy.
Three days after the debate commenced, on February 11, 1790, Madison rose from his
seat and began his speech attacking the whole scheme. While Madison acknowledged that the
federal government was deeply indebted to its citizens and that “No logic, no magic, in my
opinion, can diminish the force of the obligation” the government owed to its creditors, the
question was: to whom should the obligation extend?69 Madison supported the idea of rewarding
the current bond holders, but he also thought the original bond holders should receive their fair
share. Madison strongly believed that the new nation had done a great disservice to those who
fought for its existence by not taking the initiative of repaying them once the war had concluded.
“The value stipulated and expected is not satisfied by the steps taken by the government,”
Madison stated.70 He viewed the original holders, mostly country folk, as the most patriotic of
citizens, who were taken advantage of by speculators because of their desperate situation.
In Madison’s view, according to Chernow, these patriotic citizens did not “surrender
[their] faith in government . . . but had merely sold [their bonds] in desperation.”71 He saw these
country folk as hopeless victims down on their luck. “Madison’s arguments had a strong
sentimental appeal to patriotic veterans,” Ron Chernow wrote, “while Hamilton’s contained a
68
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core of hardheaded practicality.”72 Now, after selling their bonds for a fifth or an eighth of their
value, these country folk were expected to pay taxes to fulfill the federal government’s
obligation. In other words, these revolutionary soldiers were not only being forced to pay back in
the form of taxes the scant amount they had received for their bonds but an additional amount on
top of that. Since the value of the bonds had climbed dramatically since the conclusion of the
Revolution, Madison was against the idea of rewarding those whom he felt were undeserving,
most notably the speculators who bought the bonds from widows, orphans, and soldiers and were
now reaping huge profits. To Madison this “would be fatal to the proposed establishment of
public credit; it would moreover punish those who had put their trust in the public promises and
resources. To make the other class the sole victims was an idea at which human nature
recoiled.”73 The only solution, Madison concluded, was to repay the secondary holders the
highest amount the market will allow and then “let the residue belong to the original suffers. This
will not be perfect justice, but it will do more real justice, and perform more to the public faith,
than any other expedient proposed.”74 “The original holders,” Madison continued, “will not be
fully indemnified; but they will receive, from their country, a tribute due to their merits, which, if
it does not entirely heal their wounds, will assuage the pain of them.”75 Madison’s idea, it has
been argued, would have giving the United States the ability to: 1) interfere in business
transactions of the past, changing them if they felt the need; and 2) change the distribution of
profits as they saw fit. “It was little wonder,” Cerami wrote, “that Washington . . . supported
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Hamilton’s position and was disturbed by Madison’s apparent departure from the logic that
Washington had always found in his views.”76
This was the foremost contention between Hamilton and Madison—the unwillingness to
repay the original holders, who had sold their bonds at a much lower price in order to make ends
meet. Madison wanted the original holders “to receive a substantial profit” for their paper.77
Hamilton believed that the original bond holders were simply out of luck. He argued that the
speculators were not the villains. The real culprit was an anemic government unable to pay back
what it owed. Madison condemned the European financial system that Hamilton was trying to
model, particularly Britain’s. He felt that America should avoid imitating it at all costs. As such,
he strongly felt that Hamilton’s idea of funding the debt was a grave mistake that would transfer
wealth from the people to a select few. In a letter to Henry Lee, Madison wrote, “I go on the
principle that a Public Debt is a Public Curse and in a Rep. Govt. a greater than any other.”78
Madison did, however, state earlier in his letter that with a few modifications, assumption would
“be favorable to the pecuniary interests of Virginia.”79 The select few, in Madison’s view,
resided in the Northeast. In a letter to Edmund Pendleton, Madison expressed his dissatisfaction
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with those “who have no particular merits towards their country . . . gaining 7 to 8 times as much
as they advance.”80
Those who had originally supported Madison were shocked at what the Virginia
Representative was proposing. To many of Madison’s colleagues, not only was the plan
absolutely unworkable, but would cost the government $1.6 million more than Hamilton’s
assumption plan. Madison acknowledged that his arrangement would increase “the unavoidable
weight and duration of the burdens to be imposed,” but would bring honor to the nation because
it “compelled the government to pay the full amount that it had promised.”81 Just as Hamilton’s
proposal had created a firestorm of discontent, so did Madison’s proposal create an outcry of
injustice. Many within the House stepped forward, arguing vehemently that the extra burden
would have “devastating consequences” for the new nation.82 In addition, as Representative
Theodore Sedgwick pointed out, it was wholly unfair to the secondary holders because
Madison’s plan would “strip one class if citizens who have acquired property by the known and
established rules of law, under the specious pretense of doing justice to another.”83
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Madison disagreed with Sedgwick’s assessment, considering the government fully
responsible, as Banning wrote, “for the predicament of its disbanded soldiers.”84It was difficult
for Madison to envision a government so uncaring. As if to speak directly to Hamilton, on
February 18, 1790, Madison argued, “He must renounce every sentiment he has hitherto
cherished, before his compliance could admit that America ought to erect the monuments of her
gratitude, not to those who saved her liberties, but to those who had enriched themselves in her
funds.”85 Ironically, the debate over Madison’s motion, which lasted two weeks, allowed
speculators to buy up additional bonds. As historian Alexander McDonald wrote, “Before he was
through, Madison would put more profits into the hands of speculators than Hamilton could have
done by inviting them to help themselves to the Treasury.”86
On February 20 the House soundly defeated Madison’s proposal by a vote of 36 to 13. To
Madison’s, and probably Hamilton’s dismay, none of the thirteen vote against came from
Virginia. Banning even admitted that “Hamilton’s idea was better calculated than [Madison’s] to
foster prosperity and to promote the nations long term interest . . . it is crucial to acknowledge
that, for Madison, prosperity and rapid economic growth were not the only—not indeed the most
important—points to be considered.”87 After Madison’s funding plan was defeated, Congress
diverged from the issues presented in the Report and turned their attention to the ominous issue
of slavery and other matters.
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One of the issues most vexing for Congress was the assumption question. In order to
determine whether a state would receive a refund or owe the federal government, the expenses
incurred by the Revolution, the percentage of debt retired, and how much of the debt each state
had paid had to be figured. This process raised eyebrows across the new nation. Assumption split
the cohesive political environment of America in two separating the states into two distinct
groups: those who would benefit from it and those who felt that it was an injustice.
On the one hand, states that were shouldering a heavy war debt welcomed Hamilton’s
assumption plan, fearing that their own attempts to relieve it would bring about tax rebellions
because of the increased burden on their citizens, as had happened in Massachusetts. On the
other hand, states that had made great progress in relieving their debt objected to the plan
because they felt they would be compelled to pay their debt twice. Likewise, arguments raged
about whether some debts should be assumed while others should not. Some states argued that,
as Mitchell Broadus wrote, only “debts above a state’s proportion should be assumed, but this
was discarded.”88The state leaders felt that by assuming the entire debt, the national economy
would buckle under the weight. Although Madison doubted the merits of assumption, he clearly
understood that if the state debts were not assumed, dissolution was a very real possibility. It
must be remembered that Madison’s support for discrimination was meant to sooth his heart
more than anything else. Like any politician, he was weary of opposing a plan that would anger
is constituents, especially if they were famers.
Some states such as Massachusetts and South Carolina had accumulated large debts and
were in support of Hamilton’s plan. Other states, most notably Virginia, had retired most of their
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debt and were avidly opposed. Advocates argued that, since the war was a collective effort, the
debts should be consolidated to ensure rationality and lessen the blow of impending conflicts.
Opponents urged for the plan to be reconsidered in order to make it fairer to those states that had
taken it upon themselves to pay off their debts. Madison introduced a measure that would require
the federal government to assume the debts as they stood in 1783. As Banning wrote, his plan
would be “fairer to those states whose efforts had been greatest.”89
When the Report was first introduced by Hamilton, fairness to the original holders was
really the only obstacle preventing Madison from voting in favor of Hamilton’s proposal, but
with each passing day, Madison resisted the plan more and more. Congress returned to
Hamilton’s Report in March. By this time the southern bloc was even more determined to defeat
Hamilton’s plan. If federal power was strengthened, which southerners feared would happen
with the passage of Hamilton’s design, the federal government could possibly sometime in the
future decide to intervene in the institution of slavery. The southern faction was determined to
prevent the plan from succeeding at all costs, including but not limited to, personal attacks on
Hamilton’s character.
In addition, other members of Congress argued that the respective governments should
repudiate their debts, Hamilton argued against such a proposal in the Report stating, “States, like
individuals, who observe their engagements are respected and trusted, while the reverse is the
fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct.”90 If the state and federal governments repudiated
their debts, Hamilton continued, they would be unable to borrow money in the future, which
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would be devastating if money was needed to defend the citizenry from foreign invasion or
domestic insurrection. “Loans, in times of public danger, especially from foreign war, are . . . an
indispensible resource, even to the wealthiest of countries.”91 Finally, Hamilton wanted the $40.4
million worth of IOUs and other state obligations distributed during the Revolution to be paid
with back interest.
On April 26, 1790, the House defeated the funding bill by a vote of 32 to 18. The Senate
received the funding bill in June minus the provision for assumption. Luckily for Hamilton, the
Senate had a “bare majority” that ensured that the assumption provision would be reinserted,
only if, however, a decision on the location of the seat of government was established.92 The
proposal for relocating the seat of government, much like assumption, had engulfed the Senate in
bitter conflict. As Madison wrote in a letter to fellow Virginian James Monroe, “The provision
for the public debt has been suspended for sometime in the Senate by the question relating to the
seat of Government . . . but I am persuaded it will be awakened on the first dawn of a favorable
opportunity. It seems, indeed, as if the friends of the measure were determined to risk everything
rather than suffer [and] finally to fail.”93
Distraught over the idea that his assumption bill was on the verge of dying, Hamilton
approached Jefferson, asking him to convince his southern colleagues that assumption was an
indispensable necessity. Recognizing that the bill had greatly divided the nation, Jefferson
invited Hamilton and Madison over for dinner, and in June of 1790 they met at Jefferson quarters
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on 57 Maiden Lane in New York City.94 The social gathering that ensued has become famously
known as the Dinner-Party.
In short, the Dinner-Table bargain was a deal whereby Madison agreed not to oppose
Hamilton’s assumption plan. The main ingredient in the deal, however, involved the location of
the national capital. The capital had moved from New York back to Philadelphia in 1790, but
Virginians wanted the new capital nearer to them in the South. During the dinner-party,
Hamilton agreed to provide northern support for placing the new capital in the South in exchange
for Virginia’s votes for the assumption bill. The bargain called for the construction of the new
capital on the banks of the Potomac River, which divided Virginia and Maryland, on land to be
selected by Washington himself. The new government would move there by the beginning of the
new century, after a ten-year residence in Philadelphia.
Funding and Assumption, however, laid the foundation for the development of political
parties, the very “factions,” as Madison had called them in the Federalist Papers, that the
founding fathers hoped to avoid.95 Madison wrote that “By a faction I understand a number of
citizens

. . . who are united . . . and adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent

and aggregate interests of the community.”96 In the opinion of Cerami, the conflict divided the
nation and solidified the establishment of two distinct political parties. The mercantile New
Englanders were avid Federalists, with “Hamilton’s as the most forceful man of the party,” while
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the agrarian south and west were staunch Republicans who considered themselves “true believers
in a republican government.”97
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CHAPTER 3
JEFFERSON’S OPINION CONCERNING THE NATIONAL BANK

With a successful beginning to his funding system, Hamilton was at the pinnacle of his
popularity among merchants and individuals of wealth and property. As Bowers wrote, “He was
acclaimed the savior of the State.”98 Madison, despite reservations about Hamilton’s funding
system, even continued not only to defend Hamilton’s abilities as Secretary of Treasury but
refused to criticize Hamilton’s intentions or condemn his proposal on the whole. That was until
Hamilton proposed the creation of the national bank.
From March to December of 1790, Hamilton began to prepare his second Report on
Public Credit. The introduction and debate over the national debt was only one-half of
Hamilton’s financial objective. The other half, as reported in the second Report, concerned the
establishment of a national bank. While Madison had opposed only certain parts of Hamilton’s
proposal for funding the national debt, with the help of the Secretary of State, the two statesmen
were able to somewhat work their differences out and reach a compromise. Now, however, like
two tectonic plates colliding with each other, the idea of compromise was lost. This went doubly
true for the relationship between Jefferson and Hamilton.
Throughout the entire debate over assumption, Jefferson, the head of the Department of
State, remained neutral. Although he opposed the plan, he helped bring Hamilton and Madison
together to ensure its survival. His position of neutrality did not last long, however, because as
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soon as the issue of a national bank was proposed, Jefferson was compelled to offer his own
opinion. Hamilton and Jefferson, when it came to America’s economic structure, were polar
opposites. Hamilton envisioned an America led by industry and manufacturing, while Jefferson,
according to Chernow, “perpetuated a fantasy of America as an agrarian paradise with limited
household manufacturing.”99 Jefferson insisted, wrote Marsh, that America would “remain
virtuous for many centuries as long as they [Americans] are chiefly agriculture . . . When they
get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in
Europe.”100 Hamilton felt banks were indispensible to any government’s operation; they were
essential for the collection of revenues, dispensing payments towards the debt, handing out loans,
being used as depositories for government funds, while strengthening the federal government.
During the Revolution, Hamilton, who educated himself in the world of finance, wrote to James
Duane in September 3, 1780, that
“A bank . . . even in its commencement would answer the most valuable purposes
to government and to the proprietors; in its progress the advantages will exceed
calculation . . . The Bank of England unites public authority and faith with private
credit . . . The Bank of Amsterdam is on a similar foundation. And why cannot we
have an American bank?”101
A bill to charter the Bank of the United States for twenty years met little opposition in the
Senate, but the debate over the bill reached a feverish pitch in the House of Representatives. The
political cracks that had formed with the debate over assumption split wide open, and whatever
was left of the Hamilton/ Madison collaboration was irreversibly broken. When the bank bill
came before the House, an overture to have the bill committed for discussion and possible
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amendments was defeated 34 to 23. The next day, Madison rose from his seat and delivered an
intense condemnation of Hamilton’s plan. Part of Madison’s critique stemmed from the fact that
most southern planters were farmers who were forced to continuously purchase items on credit
and, thus, detested bankers for their perpetual servitude. Even Patrick Henry, who had remained
relatively silent throughout the debate over assumption, agreed with Madison that Hamilton’s
plan would create, as historian Harry Amman wrote, a “subserviency of southern to northern
interest.”102
First, Madison argued that the interests of the government and the business world would
be better served by numerous banking institutions rather than by a single overbearing institution.
Corporations of this type, according to Madison, had always been evils within society. In his
speech on February 8, 1791, Madison argued, “They [corporations] are a powerful machine,
which have always been found competent to effect objects on principle, in great measure
independent of the people.”103
In addition, Madison argued that the Constitution denied the government the ability to
create such an institution because it was not one of the enumerated powers granted to it.
Ironically, Madison argued just the opposite view in Federalist forty-four. In his essay, Madison
expressed his concern that the federal government, if it had to adhere only to those powers
expressly mentioned, would end up no better off than the government under the Articles of
Confederation. He stated, “[without] the substance of this power . . . the whole Constitution
would be a dead letter . . . it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as
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their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term ‘expressly’ with so much
rigor as to disarm the government of all real authority . . .”104 Now, however, fearing that
Hamilton and those who supported the plan could use the Necessary and Proper Clause to extend
its powers beyond what the framers intended, he felt he was forced to do an about-face. “The
power of granting Charters is a great and important power, and ought not to be exercised,
without we find ourselves expressly authorized to grant them . . .”105
The Constitution, Madison argued, was a document granting the government a few
explicit powers. “It is not a general grant, out of which particular powers are expected—it is a
grant of particular powers only, leaving the general mass in other hands.”106 Thus, Madison
continued, since the “general welfare” clause, copied from the Articles of Confederation, was
limited to acts “laying taxes” for specific purposes, it could not be used, nor was it meant to be
used, to legitimate the incorporation of a bank. To allow the clause to be stretched beyond its
intended boundaries “would give to Congress an unlimited power.”107 Before Madison rested, he
revisited the old argument the framers faced when confronted with demands for a bill of rights.
The framers argued, Madison asserted, that powers not explicitly given to the federal
government were retained by the states or the people, while “those given were not to be extended
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to remote implications.”108 Even if the power was enumerated in the Constitution, Madison
argued, “the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential.” Since it is not listed, he concluded,
“the exercise of it involves the guilt of usurpation, and establishes a precedent of
interpretation, leveling all barriers which limit the powers of the general
government, and protect those of the state governments . . . the power exercised
by the bill was condemned by the silence of the Constitution; was condemned by
the rule of interpretation arising out of the Constitution; was condemned by its
tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the Constitution . . .”109
While it seems that Madison’s views during the bank debate are contrary to his views
during ratification, this is not entirely correct. Neither, Madison nor any of the founders, could
have imagined creating a complete list of powers the Constitution would permit, and everyone
was quite aware that the Constitution could not possibly answer every question. He conceded
that some powers were to be implied, but he was convinced that “constructive powers” had to
have boundaries if the government was to be restricted at all.110 In other words, Madison
accepted the argument that implied powers could be used to halt an existing government entity
for usurping the people, but implied powers could not be used to create a government entity. If
doctrine could be used in this way, Madison thought, governmental power could become
unlimited.
As the debate over the bank bill reached its conclusion and Representatives prepared to
cast their vote, it became abundantly clear that two very different parties were taking shape. The
final vote was 39 to 20 in favor of the bill, but the numbers reveal something very disturbing for
the infant nation: the great majority of representatives who voted in favor of a national bank
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resided in the North, while the majority of those who voted against the bank resided in the South.
The argument between farmers and merchants and their place within the new nation and the new
government that had caused tears in America’s political and social structure during the
assumption debate was now threatening to widen to the point that the nation was coming apart at
the seams.
The tension between Madison and Jefferson and Hamilton is an example of this split. On
the one hand, Jefferson was convinced that true freedom resided in farmers. On the other hand,
Hamilton was the quintessential big business enthusiast who dreamed of an industrial America
and felt the only way to make the dream a reality was under the encouragement of an energetic
national government led by a heroic executive. Madison and Jefferson viewed the legislative
branch, as Ron Chernow wrote, as the “leading branch of government, the guardian of popular
liberty that would prevent the restoration of British tyranny.”111 Hamilton, by contrast, did not
trust the legislature and, instead, felt the strength of the executive would be the engine that drove
America in the right direction.
After the bank bill was passed by Congress, it needed President Washington’s signature
to officially become law. Those who opposed the bill desperately hoped that Washington would
see the unconstitutionality of the bill and veto the measure. Just as he had done during the
Revolution, Washington conferred with members of his cabinet before making his decision. He
solicited the opinions of his Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, and the Secretary of State,
Jefferson. While Randolph’s view was significant because it was the first delivered and agreed
that the measure was unconstitutional, Jefferson’s opinion set the tone for the opposition.
Jefferson, it has been written, “had long detested monopolies and chartered companies as
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privileges conferred by British kings.”112 In his brief, Jefferson blasted Hamilton’s proposal as
unconstitutional and outright rejected the doctrine of implied powers, scolded him for attempting
to stretch the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution beyond its intended boundaries. To
Jefferson, a national bank was not necessary or indispensible to America’s economic growth;
instead, it was just another convenient way for the government to expand its powers.
Jefferson’s argument largely followed along the lines as Madison’s. Jefferson wrote that
Hamilton’s plan “would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a
Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States and as they
would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also to do whatever evil they
pleased.”113 Jefferson assumed that if a certain phrase in the Constitution was interpreted as
having multiple meanings, the particular phrase could either “allow some meaning to the other
parts of the instrument,” or “render all the others useless.”114 To Jefferson, Hamilton’s
interpretation was incompatible with the framers intent. In his opinion, he reminded Washington
that during the Constitutional Convention certain delegates attempted to give Congress the power
to construct and incorporate canals, and the proposed provisions were rejected. He wrote,
“It [the Constitution] was intended to lace them [the executive] up straitly within
the enumerated powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could
not carried into effect; one of the reasons of rejection urged in debate was that
then they [the executive] a power to erect a bank, which would render the great
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cities, where there are prejudges and jealousies on that subject, adverse to the
reception of the Constitution.”115
In February 1792 Jefferson sent a series of letters to Washington expressing his
dissatisfaction with the direction with the government was heading while alluding to his wish of
retiring from his position. The various measures introduced by the Secretary of Treasury,
Jefferson wrote:
“had introduced its poison into the government itself . . . that particular members
of the legislature, while those laws were on the carpet, had feathered their nests
with paper, had then voted for the laws, and constantly since lent all the energy of
their talents . . . to the establishment and enlargement of the system . . . such
legislative constructions of the Constitution has made it a very different thing
from what the people thought they had submitted to . . . the doctrine that the
power given to the Constitution to collect taxes and provide for the general
welfare . . . [has] permitted Congress to take everything under their management
which they should deem for the public welfare.”116
Furthermore, Jefferson wrote that the passing of the bill had allowed Congress to endow itself
with powers to appropriate money for anything “they should deem for the public welfare.”117
From Jefferson and Madison’s point of view, the federal government was not
omniscient or omnipotent. Although the Constitution made it specifically clear that federal
actions trumped state actions, Hamilton was attempting, in their view, to use the Constitution to
make the states subservient. Their sentiments somewhat echoed those made during the
ratification process years earlier. In one of the most famous anti-federalist articles, Brutus,
probably Robert Yates, a New York judge and delegate to the New York ratifying convention,
wrote:
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“The legislative power is competent to lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises—
there is no limitation to this power . . . they are the sole judges of what is
necessary to provide for the common defense . . . not only is the power to lay
taxes unlimited, as to the amount they may require, but it is perfect and absolute
to raise them any mode they please . . . It is proper to remark, that the authority to
lay and collect taxes is the most important of any power that can be granted . . . it
is the great means of protection, security, and defense, in a good government, and
a great engine of oppression and tyranny in a bad one.”118
What Brutus was predicting was that the necessary and proper clause, as it was written, would
allow the federal government to extend its powers beyond what was intended, creating a
monster. With the legislature empowered to enact the laws and the executive in charge of
enforcing them, working together, these two branches can become overbearing. This was the
point Jefferson and Madison were trying to make.
Hamilton and his following, according to Jefferson, had become a cult, bent on
destroying the ideals of republicanism and restoring a monarchy, much like that of England. In a
letter to Thomas Paine, Jefferson wrote, “It is but true that we have a sect preaching up and
panting after an English constitution of kings, lords, and commons, and whose heads are itching
for crowns, coronets, and miters. But our people, my good friend, are firm and unanimous in
their principles of republicanism . . .”119 In other words, as Lance Banning wrote, “What he
feared was that disillusioned leaders, devoid of faith in the common man, would capture the reins
of government first, and then subvert the Constitution, until they had made their own rule a
hereditary aristocracy or worse.”120 When Virginia’s governor Henry Lee attempted to open a
state controlled bank that would counter Hamilton’s national bank, Jefferson wrote to Madison
expressing his dissatisfaction with Hamilton’s plan. “The power of erecting banks and
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corporations,” Jefferson wrote, “was not given to the general government; it remains then with
the state itself. For any person to recognize a foreign legislature in a case belonging to the state
itself is an act of treason against the state. And whosever shall do any act under color of the
authority of a foreign legislature . . . shall be judged of high treason and suffer death.”121
It must be remembered that Jefferson and Madison were politicians whose ideals were
subject to change according to various circumstances. While both preached that Hamilton’s plan
was unconstitutional and regarded industrialization as vile because it subjected the masses to the
will of a few, both used these established precedents to their advantage later on when national
security became an issue or when their fear of factions in Congress had subsided.
Washington was squarely on Hamilton’s side over the national bank issue but was
concerned by Jefferson’s comments. “It made no sense to him [Washington],” wrote Charles
Cerami, “that one could establish a national bank simply because no one had inserted those exact
words into the Constitution.”122 After reading over the opinions penned by Jefferson and
Randolph, Washington summoned Madison to the Executive Mansion in Philadelphia. There, the
two engaged in several lengthy conversations, as the “little giant of the Constitutional
Convention” expressed his dissatisfaction with Hamilton’s measures.123
With Washington’s responsibility to either sign the bank bill or let it die drawing to an
end, he requested that Madison put his objections to paper. He then hurried the Attorney
General’s and Secretary of State’s opinions to Hamilton, asking him to reply. Upon receiving
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Washington’s letter and the briefs, Hamilton consulted a law colleague, William Lewis, gathered
his thoughts and wrote a fifteen thousand word, forty- page treatise on the constitutionality of the
national bank, and, in doing so, as Lance Banning wrote, laid the “foundation for the liberal
interpretation of the Constitution.”124 If one was to sum up Hamilton’s argument in one sentence,
it would read that the federal government, as Ron Chernow wrote, “must possess the means to
attain ends for which it was established or the bonds of society would dissolve.”125
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPORTANCE OF A NATIONAL BANK

For much of early English history prior to the Glorious Revolution, debt was accumulated
and managed by the king. Thereafter, Parliament instituted, as Robert Wright wrote, “a good
dose of Dutch republicanism, finance, and public administration.”126 Before long, this practice
won the confidence of investors and made London the financial center of Europe and then the
world. Along with the trading of joint-stock corporations, the most important entity generated by
Parliament was the creation of the Bank of England, which laid the foundation for the handling
of a national debt for future generations. Hamilton looked at the banks of Europe, particularly
that of England as a reference for his own ideas. In a letter to James Duane on September 3,
1780, Hamilton wrote, “The Bank of England unites public authority and faith with private credit
. . . The Bank of Amsterdam is on a similar foundation. And why cannot we have an American
bank? A bank . . . even in its commencement would answer the most valuable purposes to
government and to the proprietors; in its progress the advantages will exceed calculation.”127
The national bank was the linchpin of Hamilton’s entire financial system. Its creation was
essential for America’s survival because it would be responsible for, as Lance Banning wrote,
“receiving federal taxes, holding federal funds, and [serve] as a ready source of short-term
federal loans,” all of which would lead to “rapid economic growth.”128 In addition, the bank
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would be owned by both the government and private investors, giving citizens a stake in the
federal government. In order to understand the importance of the bank a review of the financial
system under the Articles of Confederation is imperative.
To pay for the Revolution, state governments and the Continental Congress issued bills of
credit, considered much more practical than levying taxes. This was especially true since British
occupation rendered collection in some areas impossible; in those areas not under British control,
revolts against tax collectors were frequent. Furthermore, the colonies had never been very good
at collecting and managing tax revenue to begin with. The colonial governments managed to
borrow little abroad in the early stages of the war, but borrowing had increased dramatically by
1780. Some of the money borrowed came from America’s allies, especially France, but much of
the money after 1781 came from private investors, mostly Dutch. The issuance of bonds was
well established by the beginning of the war and played an important role in the financing effort,
but loans made up the bulk of the government’s resources. To further fund the war effort, the
Continental Congress sought to create an institution that could provide readily available revenue.
The charter of the Bank of the United States was not America’s first attempt at creating a
national bank. In the midst of the American Revolution, and shortly after accepting the office of
Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris asked the Continental Congress to charter the Bank of
North America. Even though a few congressmen, including the young Madison, argued the
Articles of Confederation did not provide the government with the power to create such an
institution, Morris’s proposal passed and the bank went into operation in January 1782. Initially,
Morris’s bank served the government well as it provided emergency loans, supplied money to

51

commercial centers, and stimulated the economy by funding business projects.129 It was not
created, however, to help relieve the ever growing debt, which caused the economy to eventually
slip. Morris’s bank plan played an extremely important part in Hamilton’s education concerning
America’s finance. He thought very highly of Morris and thought of him as the only person who
could at the time properly manage the financial affairs of the country. In a letter to Morris,
Hamilton wrote, “I know of no other person who unites so many advantages . . . In the frankness
of truth I believe, Sir, you are the man best capable of performing this great work.”130 Although
the Bank of North America proved to be a success, as far as obtaining loans from foreign banks
and paying the interest on the debt, it did not solve America’s revenue problem as many had
hoped.
After the Revolution, America’s financial system teetered on chaos because the Articles
mentioned nothing about the central government repaying its debt, and most states still owed
most of which they had borrowed. This was largely the result of the unwillingness of the
country’s leading figures to discuss the issue. Even during the Philadelphia Convention, men
who became impassioned during the debates over a bi-cameral or uni-cameral legislature, turned
their backs to talk of finances. The lack of discussion created a crisis in the middle-part of the
1780s when states, because there was no national coinage, forced merchants and citizens alike to
accept paper money as currency, although it did not have the same value as gold. When various
state courts refused to enforce the acceptance of paper money, merchants closed their shops,
while farmers began to riot. As Cerami wrote:
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“there were places where near starvation followed as shops preferred to stay
closed rather than exchange food for money that was soon to become worthless . .
. In most of the country, farms and homes were being sold or foreclosed for nonpayment on mortgages . . . People were increasingly infuriated [with] the local
authorities, the courts, and the confederation government.”131
Frustrated by the lack of agreement in Congress about how to resuscitate the deteriorating
financial structure in America, Morris resigned in November 1784. Several incompetent
financiers tried to deal with the situation after Morris left, but America was essentially bankrupt.
The new nation could not pay her bills because of the glaring problems associated with the
Articles of Confederation. The Articles allowed the nation to remain a loose confederation of
states instead of a united country. The distrust of central authority denied the national
government, as Wright wrote, the “power of the purse — the Articles of Confederation did not
inspire confidence among merchants, manufactures, or urban artisans. Under this document, the
national government could not do much of anything.”132 Hamilton in 1781 expressed his concern
about the lack of central authority in a series of essays. In The Continentalist No. 1, he wrote,
“the Federal Government, if it is too weak at first . . . will continually grow weaker. The
ambition and local interests of the respective members, will be constantly undermining and
usurping upon its prerogatives, till it comes to a dissolution . . .”133 In Continentalist No. 3,
Hamilton wrote that the deficiencies of the Confederation should not fall upon the shoulders of
Congress. The lack of authority “is partly . . . attributed to an excessive compliance to the spirit,
which has evidently actuated the majority of the states, a desire of monopolizing all power in
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themselves. Congress have been responsible for the administration of affairs, without the means
of fulfilling that responsibility.”134
The solution was presented during the debates of the Constitution Convention in 1789,
through Article I, sections 8, 9, and 10. Collectively, the sections granted the federal government
the power to tax as long as the taxes were uniform throughout the country and the power to
borrow money, both of which met little resistance. A little more controversial was the section
that granted the federal government the power “To Coin Money, regulate the value of . . .”
Although the section passed by a vote of 33 to 6, it might have been closer if Rhode Island had
sent delegates to the Convention. Rhode Island was controlled by supporters of state-issued
paper money. When a message reached the smallest state in the Union that the section had
passed, it, as Wright argued, “convulsed the State nearly to Civil War.”135 The battle was just
beginning, however. The document that would define the nation still had to be ratified, and
during the process, Hamilton with the help of Madison and Jay advanced the idea of a more
energetic government.
Hamilton argued in Federalists 11, 12, and 13 that the Constitution would energize
economic growth by putting fiscal and monetary policy in the hands of the national government,
and, with availability of a commanding navy, keep other nations from preying on shipping, thus,
keeping commerce unrestrained. “Under a vigorous national government,” Hamilton wrote, “the
natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the
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combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.”136 Under the system of government
dominated by the states, Hamilton warned, America’s commerce would be at the mercy of rival
nations. During the New York ratification convention, Hamilton gave such an oratorical
masterpiece that one historian proclaimed him a “political porcupine, armed at all points,” while
brandishing “a shaft at every opposer.”137
Hamilton’s quest for a more active central government reached its height when he
presented to Congress on December 14, 1790, his Second Report on Public Credit. His opening
paragraph laid forth the foundation of his entire argument. He wrote: “a national bank is an
Institution of primary importance to the prosperous administration of the Finances, and would be
the greatest utility in the operation with the support of the Public Credit.”138 In his Second Report
Hamilton exposed the glaring problem of tax revenue trickling into the treasury. He wrote that a
national bank was essential to the new government because it could be used as an instrument by
which large sums of money would be lent to various state governments, or the federal
government for short-terms to help overcome temporary imbalances between revenues and
expenditures. Hamilton stated that while state banks had been helpful, they were just too small
and their interest too narrow to be of any help during times of emergency or economic crises.
Public banks, he stated, have played an indispensable role in assisting governments in war and
peace; they have provided aid during “dangerous and distressing emergencies” and have helped
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bolster improvement during other times.139 With a bank roll of $10 million, the national bank
would be larger than all existing banks combined140. Because of its size, the regulation of the
existing state banks could be easily achieved.
Furthermore, Hamilton stressed the need for America to catch up with the most
economically advanced nations of Europe. “It is a fact well understood,” he wrote, “that public
banks have found admission and patronage among the principle and most enlightened
commercial nations.”141 Among “the principle advantages of a Bank,” Hamilton argued that
banks can solidify a nation’s currency, while stimulating the economy.142 If a merchant keeps his
money in a chest, Hamilton wrote, “waiting for a favorable opportunity to employ it,” he can
take comfort in knowing that it is saved, “but it will produce nothing until an opportunity
arrives.”143 If the money is deposited in a bank, however, the merchant or someone else can
borrow against the money, receiving a “much larger amount” then what is deposited.144
Secondly, Hamilton argued that governments can borrow against the collective deposits “in
obtaining pecuniary aid.”145 The bank, for instance, could use its deposits as credit for future
loans while also increasing the circulation and supply of specie, eliminating the need for barter.
“There is in the nature of things . . . an intimate connection of interest between the government
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and the bank of a nation.”146 Finally, Hamilton stated that the national bank would be a great
benefit in the collection of taxes and federal disbursements.
In preparing his Report, Hamilton relied heavily on the experiences of European bankers,
and the theories of Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations. Although there were banks already
established in America, such as the Bank of New York, which Hamilton founded in June of
1784, historians have had a difficult time determining whether Hamilton referred to their
practices or not since they too operated according to the European model. There was, however,
no other model that directly influenced Hamilton’s ideas more than the Bank of England. While
Hamilton cannot be accused of copying the charter word for word, the charter creating the Bank
of the United States was strikingly similar to the original charter establishing the Bank of
England.
Hamilton also relied on the debates concerning the re-chartering of the Bank of North
America. He extensively studied the arguments for and against the bank, looking with a keen eye
at those arguments made by its opponents--the debates, ironically enough, mirrored those of
Congress in 1791. The general fear among many Americans at the time was that the Bank of
North America, as it grew ever more profitable, would pull back on the reins of specie
circulation, making money increasingly scarce. Furthermore, because of the bank’s profitability,
Europeans would invest more and more of their money in the bank, getting rich off the interest,
resulting in a large sum of American currency being held in the hands of foreigners. The time
would arrive, the opponents of the bank argued, when the “engine of power may become subject
to foreign influence; this country may be agitated with the politics of European courts, and the
good people of America reduced once more into a state of subordination and dependence upon
146
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someone or other of the European powers.”147 To counter such arguments proponents of the bank
proposed regulations, very similar to those in the charter of the Bank of England, that would
limit foreign investment.
Another fear was that the Bank of North America would be given certain exclusive
privileges, creating a monopoly. In fact, during the Revolution, the directors of the bank
persuaded several states to prohibit the establishment of local banks. In a letter to Morris in 1781,
Hamilton listed several important functions a national bank would conduct, advocated the
granting of monopoly status to a national bank, stating “No other banks public or private [should
be] permitted during that period . . . other banks might excite a competition prejudicial to the
interest of this [bank] and multiply and diversify paper credit too much.”148 Hamilton explained
in his 1791 Report that, because the national bank would be responsible for the ebb and flow of
the nation’s currency, Congress must be prohibited from incorporating a similar institution,
although he was adamant that state banks should be prohibited from exercising the same
functions. Other members of Congress feared that the plan would essentially erode the
importance of the Constitution. Madison, a decade later, echoed the same sentiments to President
Jefferson, when he wrote:
“If this licentiousness in constructive perversions of the Constitution [should]
continue, we shall soon have to look into our code of laws and not the charter of
the people for the form as well as the powers of our government. Indeed, such an
unbridled spirit of construction as has gone forth in sundry instances would bid
defiance to any possible parchment securities against usurpation.”149
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Hamilton took all these arguments and counter-arguments into consideration when constructing
his plan. He knew full well that the same arguments would be made during the congressional
debates on his bank plan.
With such a large institution, the fear that the bank would misuse its power was a
potential sticking point Hamilton knew he had to address. As a check on the bank’s power,
Hamilton proposed allowing the treasury department to examine the bank’s records, while
having the authority to distribute the bank’s deposits to other locations as the department saw fit.
In addition, he forbade foreign stockholders a vote in the election of bank directors, he suggested
that the rotation of bank directors be mandatory, and he required the bank to be re-chartered or
discontinued in twenty years, while allowing the states an opportunity to create as many
additional banks as they wished. Hamilton did not deny the fact that abuses would occur and
loans would be granted to individuals who would be unable to repay them, but the advantages far
outweighed the disadvantages. In a letter to Morris years earlier, Hamilton wrote that every
measure and every action contemplated or passed by Congress, no matter how well intended, is
“subject to abuse and when abused becomes pernicious.”150 “The truth is,” he continued, “in
human affairs, there is no good, pure, and unmixed; every advantage has two sides, and wisdom
consists in availing ourselves to the good, and guarding as much as possible against the bad.”151
These instances are only minor incursions, Hamilton argued, upon an otherwise beneficial
institution.
“If the abuses of a beneficial thing are to determine its condemnation, there is
scarcely a source of public prosperity, which will not speedily be closed. In every
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case, the evil is to be compared with the good, and in the present case such a
comparison will issue in this, that the new and increased energies . . . greatly
outweigh the partial ills . . . of a few individuals . . . or of the numbers in
particular conjunctures.”152
Hamilton intended the Bank of the United States to remain in the hands of private
investors, governed by a board of directors made of a “small and select class of men.”153 Thus,
politicians with deceitful agendas would be insulated from the bank’s operations. “To attach full
confidence to an institution of this nature, it appears to be an essential ingredient in its structure
that it shall be under the guidance of individual interest, not of public policy.”154 Hamilton
rejected the government’s participation in the management of the national bank. History had
shown that in the past governments had used banks to fund needless extravagances; “private
interest is the best guide of policy from the point of view of management of it and investment in
it and the only security for a careful and prudent administration.”155 Hamilton, however, also
expressed his concern that creating a buffer zone between the bank and the government would
lead to abusive habits among the board members. To negate such a possibility the federal
government would be allowed to become a minority stockholder. The President of the United
States would be authorized to purchase two million dollars of bank stock, while the Secretary of
Treasury would receive weekly reports on the activities of the bank and preserve the right to
inspect its books. His deliberate interlocking of the bank and public debt made it nearly
impossible to remove one part without destroying the whole.
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The Bank of the United States would also allow the government to oversee and regulate
four powers enumerated in the Constitution: the collection of taxes, the borrowing of money, the
regulation of trade among the states, and the organization of the armies and the fleets. History
had shown, Hamilton wrote, that banks played an indispensible role in aiding trade and industry
while also providing the government with security in distressful situations. One would think,
Hamilton continued, that with all of this evidence, the opinions in favor of such an institution
would be overwhelming. “Yet doubts have been entertained; jealousies and prejudices have
circulated; and though the experiment is everyday dissipating them . . . yet there are still persons
by whom they have not yet been entirely renounced.”156 He never directly attacked Madison like
he would Thomas Jefferson, but he did get his own sense of revenge. In his opinion supporting
the constitutionality of the bank, Hamilton wrote, “No axiom is more clearly established in law,
or in reason, than that wherever a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
necessary for doing it is included.”157 These words were not Hamilton’s; they were written by
Madison in Federalist forty-four. The Virginia representative had to have sat in a state of dismay
as Hamilton’s opinion was read out loud in the House.
After receiving Jefferson’s and Randolph’s opinions concerning the bank, Hamilton
decided to put pen to paper and refute any disagreements. Hamilton began his opinion on the
constitutionality of the bank by avidly disagreeing with Jefferson’s and Randolph’s belief that
the Constitution forbade the creation of corporations by the United States government because
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such power was not explicitly mentioned. They feared, as Koch wrote, that “The legislation that
would sanction the incorporation of a national bank would therefore undermine the original
intention of the framers of the Constitution and beget a monopoly that would jeopardize the
equal rights of every citizen.”158 Hamilton affirmed that “the power of erecting a corporation is
not included in any of the enumerated powers; but was rather an implied power granted through
various clauses.”159 If it can be argued that the Constitution denied the federal government the
ability to incorporate institutions because the framers did not specifically grant the power to it, it
can also be argued, Hamilton wrote, that the Constitution denied the states that same ability to
act since only certain powers were delegated to them. “To deny that the Government of the
United States has sovereign power as to its declared purposes & trusts, because its power does
not extend to all cases, would be equally to deny that the State Governments would not have
sovereign power in every case because their power does not extend to every case.”160 In
Hamilton’s mind, if a government action such as erecting a corporation has a “natural”
relationship with the desired end, then the employment and execution of that action will fall
within the scope of the government’s prerogatives.161 He amplified this explanation by arguing
that the government cannot create a corporation, for example, to superintend the police of a
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particular city because the corporation did not have a relationship with the actions of law
enforcement, but, as he stated, “one may be erected in relation to the collection of taxes, or to the
trade with foreign countries.”162
The essential ingredient in Hamilton’s argument concerning the bank’s constitutionality
centered on the “Necessary and Proper” clause of the Constitution. To Hamilton, the
Constitution was not meant to be a restrictive document, whereby the federal government carried
through with only those powers spelled out. Such a narrow interpretation, one in which the
action had to be absolutely necessary, would be onerous. “There are few measures of any
government, which would stand so severe a test.”163 Instead, he wrote, the necessity of an act
differs with each individual situation and is always a matter of opinion. “The means by which
national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity
promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent, and complexity that there must, of necessity, be
great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of those means.”164 The necessary and
proper clause does not give the government any “new or independent power” that it can unjustly
invoke, but only gives the government the authority to extend upon its specified powers.165 “This
criterion,” Hamilton wrote, “is the end to which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be
clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, & if the measure has an obvious
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relation to the end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution—it may
be safely deemed to come within the compass of the national authority.”166
Hamilton agreed with Jefferson’s claim that the corporation, if enacted by Congress and
signed by the President, would alter state laws, but Hamilton argued that the threat of alteration
could not deem the corporation unconstitutional. Laws concerning bankruptcy and coinage that
may differ from state to state can be altered by the federal government in order to bring about
uniformity. The exercise of these powers can extend to the creation of a national bank to oversee
the collection of taxes. Hamilton also argues against Jefferson’s notion that “the proposed
incorporation is against the laws of monopoly.”167 The fallacy of Jefferson’s argument, Hamilton
wrote, lies in the fact that the national bank would not impede the ability of the states to erect
their own banks, or discourage individuals from associating with these businesses. “The byelaws of such an institution,” he continued, is that “a bank can only operate upon its own
members; can only concern the disposition of its own property, and must essentially resemble the
rules of a private mercantile partnership. They are expressly not to be contrary to law; and law
must here mean the law of a state as well as the United States.”168 Saying that the federal
government has the power to “erect a corporation,” Hamilton concluded, is not affirming that it
has the power to “do whatever else they please.”169
Hamilton then turned his attention to his own opinion of why such an endeavor is
necessary to the execution of the powers granted to the federal government. Hamilton wrote that
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the “principles . . . espoused by the Secretary of State and Attorney General would be fatal to the
American experiment.”170 The national bank, after all, was the key ingredient to America’s
financial success. All of Hamilton’s other recommendations, particularly assumption, could have
been passed, but without the affirmation of the bank the whole system would have collapsed.
The federal government did not have an institution capable of overseeing all of these
different responsibilities, and, thus, it would have belonged to the states to handle these duties.
The experience of America under the Articles of Confederation had demonstrated that the states
were not responsible enough to deal with the task. State banks could not have supplied the
federal government with the necessary means to carry through with its functions; only a national
bank created for that very purpose could achieve such lofty expectations.
Hamilton listed several ways in which the bank would be of necessity to the new nation.
He wrote that the national bank would be comingled with the governmental functions of
collecting taxes, borrowing money, regulating trade between the states and foreign nations, and
“raising, supporting, and maintaining fleets and armies.”171 First, “A bank,” he wrote, “relates to
the collection of taxes in two ways: indirectly, by increasing the quantity of circulating medium
& quickening circulation . . . directly, by creating a convenient species of medium . . .”172
Hamilton warned that if a national bank was not created to oversee the collection of revenue and
the circulation of cash, America’s currency would devalue to the point where it was virtually
worthless, and America would be unable to pay back her debts, causing great distress among her
creditors, which, in turn, would cause conflict that would lead to her destruction.
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Secondly, he appealed to Washington’s military background by connecting the bank with
the potential emergencies of war. Hamilton stated that when such an emergency arose the federal
government would be able to borrow money from the bank and supply the army much faster than
it could by raising taxes and waiting for the results to be available. “A nation is threatened with
war. Large sums of money are wanted, on a sudden, to make the requisite preparations. Taxes are
laid for the purpose, but it requires time to obtain the benefit of them. Anticipation is
indispensible. If there be a bank, the supply can, at once be had; if there be none loans from
individuals must be sought.”173 Thus, it is necessary and proper for the government to erect an
institution for the purpose of carrying out the requirements that follow such emergencies.
Finally, the institution is paramount to the “regulation of trade between the states”
because of the bank’s ability to circulate money and prevent the “displacement” of a medium of
exchange.174 “Money,” Hamilton wrote, “is the very hinge on which commerce turns.”175
Hamilton agreed with Jefferson’s argument that such actions would interfere with the internal
mechanisms of the states. Hamilton wrote, however, that all actions taking by the federal
government would, in one way or another, affect the internal actions of the states.
The regulation of money and trade, however, was not the object of the national bank,
Hamilton argued. The essential element was the results that come about because of the
regulations. “The support of Government; the support of the troops for common defense; the
payment of the public debt are the true causes for raising money.”176 Essentially, the national
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bank is meant to improve the nation’s credit, both publicly and privately. By improving the
public credit the rights and interests of the state are protected because it has money to fall back
on; by improving private credit wealth is distributed because individuals are able to borrow and
spend. “Industry is increased, commodities are multiplied, and agriculture and manufacturing
flourish, and here in consists the true wealth and prosperity of the state.” 177Such actions were
manifestly granted by the Constitution to effectively administer the finances of the United States.
Hamilton, in his closing statements, reiterated that the bank would in no way encroach upon the
sovereignty of the states or the liberties of the people. “Each state,” he wrote, “may still erect as
many banks as it please; every individual may still carry on the banking business to an extent as
he pleases.”178
Hamilton warned Washington that if Randolph’s and Jefferson’s views were accepted,
“the United States would furnish the singular spectacle of a political society without sovereignty
or of a people governed without government.”179 In other words, by vetoing the bank bill,
Washington would be making the federal government subservient to the states, and America
would be no better off than it was under the Articles of Confederation.
A year later in 1792 in a letter to Colonel Edward Carrington, Hamilton expressed his
distrust of state governments. He wrote that the fear was not that the federal government would
become omnipotent; the fear was that state power would render federal power incompetent. “As
to the destruction of the state governments, the great and real anxiety is to be able to preserve the
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national from the too potent and the counteracting influence of those governments.”180 He also
blasted Jefferson and Madison for opposing both the assumption bill and the proposal for the
national bank, as he wrote, their “stile and manner which I felt as partaking of asperity and ill
humor.”181
Hamilton feared that the state governments would, just as they had under the Articles of
Confederation, overpower the federal government. Only circumscribed under the authority of the
national government, he argued, could the state governments be useful and beneficial. “If the
States were all the size of Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey,” he wrote, “I should decided
regard the local governments both safe and useful. As the thing is now . . . the Government of the
Unites States will not be able to maintain itself against their influence.”182 It was not as if
Hamilton did not trust the republican theory of government, he just was not sold on the idea that
it would work. Instead, he envisioned the state governments as laboratories for the federal
government, where various ideas could be experimented with before being implemented by
Congress. In the end, however, Hamilton viewed history on his side. “In all questions of this
nature,” he wrote, “the practice of mankind ought to have great weight against the theories of
individuals.”183
On July 4, 1791, Hamilton’s Bank of the United States threw open its doors to an
expectant public that, crazed with anticipation, bought every issue of stock within an hour. The
mania caused prices to promptly take off and spread to other cities, most notably New York and
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Boston through their respective banks. Even Vice-President John Adams, an ardent opponent of
the banking system, was generally satisfied with its results. Years later, in a letter to his good
friend Benjamin Rush, Adams wrote,
“Funding and banks I never approved, or was satisfied with our funding system; it
was founded on no consistent principle; it was contrived to enrich particular
individuals at the public expense. Our whole banking system I ever abhorred . .
But I cannot be an enemy of the funding or banking system. They are absolutely
and indispensably necessary . . . But every bank of discount, every bank by which
interest is to be paid or profit of any kind made by the deponent is downright
corruption.”184
In other words, although Adams, who was a farmer himself, had a distrust of banks, believing
whole-heartedly that land was the safest investment of all, or, like Madison and Jefferson, that an
agricultural society was much more stable than a manufacturing society, he was pleased with the
prosperity that was engulfing America.
Madison and Jefferson, however, were mystified by the “delirium of speculation.”185
Madison wrote to Washington, Smith recorded, that “It remains to be seen whether in a country
whose capital is too small to carry its own commerce, to establish manufactures, erect buildings .
. . such sums should have been withdrawn from these useful pursuits to be employed in
gambling.”186 Criticisms also came from within the Congress itself and centered on the thirtyfive members who got rich quickly because of the high price of the bonds.
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Although Hamilton had written to his southern constituents in the hope that they could be
enticed to buy bank shares, suspicions abounded that Hamilton was showing favoritism towards
northern investors, leading some southern Congressmen to declaim that a northern oligarchy was
taking root and that it would soon impose its will on the rest of the country. The get-rich-quick
scheme that many Americans found themselves addicted to was in direct opposition of
Jefferson’s view of a pure, agrarian America. As Jefferson wrote in the summer of 1791,
according to Joseph Davis, “Ships are lying at the wharves, buildings are stopped, capitals are
withdrawn from commerce, manufactures, arts, and agriculture to be employed in gambling, and
the tide of public prosperity almost unparalleled in any country is arrested in its course and
suppressed by the rage of getting rich in one day.”187 The problem with Hamilton’s grand design,
according to the opponents of the bank plan, was that it favored the wealthy rather than the lesswell off, which threatened some of the founder’s belief about what sort of nation America should
become. Representative James Jackson of Georgia, who favored higher taxes rather than a
“permanent funded debt” or a national bank, blasted both of Hamilton’s plans as a burden to “the
honest, hard-working part of the community,” while “promoting the ease and luxury of men of
wealth.”188 The fear that Jackson had was that, overtime, Hamilton’s plan would create a division
between North and South, East and West that could potentially split the country apart.
Despite the fears of many, as Robert Wright wrote, “The bank of the United States
proved to be smashing success.”189 The public stocks offered by the bank soared to new heights
in a very short time just as Hamilton had planned and greased state and national treasuries with
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an abundance of money, so much so that the bank president, Thomas Willing, had to urge the
government to scale-back. Throughout the month, the prices rose to unfathomable heights. In
early July, stocks sold for twenty-five dollars; by the middle of August, prices had zoomed to
more than three hundred dollars. Helped by low interest rates, low taxes, and a steady supply of
cash, many small business owners, farmers, professionals, and artisans were able to achieve their
material aspirations. “Throughout its existence,” Wright wrote, “the BUS provided the treasury
with valuable assistance in the collection, safe storage, transfer, and disbursement of government
monies, including interest payments and the national debt. It also smoothed the Treasury’s cash
flow, allowing it to spread tax collection over months and even years, rendering taxation less
onerous.”190
America emerged from the Revolution technologically deficient and lacking in “capitalbuilding facilities.”191 In large part, however, because the change in attitude and philosophy that
developed during the 1780s by a small but determined group of individuals and America’s trial
and error of various manufactures, the United States made the turn from a backwater society to a
society that stressed manufacturing. The national bank, which served as a source of credit and
loans for industrial and commercial enterprises, proved to be America’s most important
institution, pushing the country forward and preserving its ability to survive and thrive. As
Heilbraner wrote, Hamilton’s bank established “the credit worthiness of the government and
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there by laid the groundwork for the climate of confidence needed to advance the shaky cause of
manufacturing.”192
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